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1  | INTRODUC TION
“Don't feel sorry for refugees—believe in them” (Mufleh, 2017); 
“Refugees don't need your pity” (Badkhen, 2016); “Integrate refu-
gees with help, not pity” (De Gruyter, 2016). These headlines suggest 
that feeling pity for someone is a problematic, paternalistic emo-
tion that may stand in the way of effective action. However, phi-
losophers (Konstan, 2015) and social psychologists alike have been 
interested in the nature of pity as an ambivalent emotion (Lunardo & 
Bezençon, 2015) without offering a clear-cut answer to the question 
whether pity is a useful (Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 1999) or 
a harmful emotion (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Thomas, McGarty, & 
Mavor, 2009). So far, there is only limited evidence that pity can help ef-
forts to reduce socio-economic and political disadvantage. Therefore, 
we ask whether pity for a disadvantaged outgroup can motivate soli-
darity-based collective action by advantaged group members.
1.1 | Forms and targets of supportive behavior
Ally collective action is conducted in political solidarity with another 
group (Becker, 2012). Collective action usually refers to activism in 
the form of political protests, such as signing petitions or participat-
ing in demonstrations with the goal of social change (Wright, Taylor, 
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Abstract
We argue that pity can motivate collective action intentions toward groups that are 
both politically and economically deprived. We tested this connection in four online 
surveys and an experiment. In Study 1 (N = 1,007), pity for the Roma in Hungary 
predicted collective action intentions, which was replicated in Study 2 in connection 
with refugees in Germany (N = 191) and in Hungary (N = 563). Study 3 (N = 475) 
demonstrated that for not economically but politically disadvantaged groups (e.g., 
sexual minorities), pity was not a predictor of ally action. In an experiment (Study 4, 
N = 447), pity was just as strong a predictor of collective action intentions as out-
rage on behalf of an economically and politically disadvantaged outgroup. Pity can 
be a mobilizing emotion when it comes to groups that are both economically and 
politically disadvantaged; however, outrage remains more important in the absence 
of economic hardship.
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& Moghaddam, 1990; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Such 
forms of action may help overturn inequality and produce long-term 
change, so we also refer to them as political action (Leach, Iyer, & 
Pedersen, 2006; Thomas & McGarty, 2018, refer to this as activist 
support; Van de Vyver and Abrams 2017, refer to this as justice rel-
evant prosocial action). In contrast, intergroup helping or donation is a 
form of support with little social change potential that may even con-
tribute to maintaining the status quo (see, e.g., Nadler, 2002; Thomas 
& McGarty, 2018, refer to this as benevolent support; Van de Vyver & 
Abrams, 2017, refer to this as benevolence relevant prosocial action). 
Studies of ally collective action mainly focus on activism on behalf 
of groups that are targets of prejudice, discrimination, and (political) 
threats but do not necessarily face disadvantage in economic terms 
(for example sexual minorities in Western countries, who are diverse 
in socio-economic status [SES]). In contrast, studies of volunteerism 
focus on economic rather than political (civic, or human rights) disad-
vantages (e.g., the poor, homeless people, and victims of humanitar-
ian crises, Kende, 2016; Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012).
We focus on groups that suffer both economic deprivation 
(such as a lower SES, lack of resources, poor housing and health 
conditions) and political disadvantages (such as violation of 
their rights, discrimination, and lack of respect). Such groups 
tend to be perceived as vulnerable, in need of help and depen-
dent on care. They tend to evoke prosocial emotions in members 
of advantaged groups, such as sympathy or pity, that motivate 
supportive behavior (van Alphen, Dijker, Bos, van den Borne, & 
Curfs, 2011). Advantaged group members can show support for 
such groups either by fulfilling their material needs by dona-
tions, volunteerism, and charitable acts or by engaging in polit-
ical action as allies to gain political recognition, fight injustices, 
and achieve change in the intergroup status quo (Marullo & 
Edwards, 2000; Radke, Kutlaca, Siem, Wright, & Becker, 2020). 
In this context, the distinction between prosocial emotions and 
outrage, and between benevolent and activist support (Thomas 
& McGarty, 2018), is blurred because motivations for alleviat-
ing the suffering of the disadvantaged group and fighting the 
structural injustice can coexist (Becker, Ksenofontov, Siem, & 
Love, 2019; Kende, Lantos, Belinszky, Csaba, & Lukács, 2017).
1.2 | Intergroup emotions toward the disadvantaged
In response to perceived injustice, intergroup emotions have a regu-
latory function of intergroup behavior, that is, specific action ten-
dencies are linked to the experience of different specific emotion 
(Halperin, 2014; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004). Groups elicit dif-
ferent intergroup emotions depending on the type of disadvantage 
they suffer, which can lead to different behavioral intentions toward 
them. On the one hand, perceived intergroup injustice toward po-
litically disadvantaged groups (e.g., the violation of human rights) 
typically elicits anger (Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Montada & 
Schneider, 1989; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004) or 
outrage (Leach et al., 2002; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). Outrage is a 
politicized emotion in response to the violation of moral convictions 
(van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011), therefore it fos-
ters collective action (Thomas & McGarty, 2009).
Injustice appraisals can not only stem from perceived grievances 
of political oppression, but can be responses to the needs and depri-
vation of economically disadvantaged groups, which usually lead to 
prosocial emotions of empathy, sympathy, or pity, typically eliciting 
prosocial behavior, such as helping (see the BIAS map, Cuddy, Fiske, & 
Glick, 2007). We propose to go beyond the dichotomy of outrage and 
collective action, versus the link between prosocial emotion and inter-
group helping. We suggest that the prosocial emotion of pity might be 
just as genuine and adequate an emotional response when it comes 
to outgroups that suffer from both economic and political hardships, 
and hence may be a predictor of collective action similarly to outrage.
1.3 | Pity as a “good enough” emotion on 
behalf of the economically deprived
Pity is an other-focused emotion in response to the perceived distress 
of someone in need. It is a negative emotional state, a result of a down-
ward comparison which reflects a status difference between the self 
and the other (Smith, 2000). Pity, like other prosocial emotions, such 
as sympathy or compassion, can be connected to an increased arousal 
in response to the suffering of others. The more serious the perceived 
disadvantage is, the more likely advantaged group members are to 
experience prosocial emotions (Dijker & Koomen, 2003). According to 
the stereotype-content model, outgroups considered high in warmth, 
but low in competence (as a result of perceived vulnerability) tend to 
evoke the emotional response of pity (Cuddy et al., 2007). In line with 
this, the theory of vulnerability-based morality suggests that groups 
in need induce higher vulnerability appraisals based on specific cues, 
evoking moral emotions, such as sympathy. Such emotions usually 
lead to an evolutionary care mechanism to support the group by any 
possible means (Dijker, 2014).
Our goal in the present article was to compare the prosocial 
emotion of pity to outrage in their potential to predict collective 
action on behalf of groups with different types of disadvantages. 
In many previous studies about the implications of prosocial emo-
tions on intergroup behavior, pity, sympathy, and empathy were 
used interchangeably (e.g., Boler, 1997; Wispé, 1986), which makes 
it hard to disentangle the functions of each emotion. In our theoriz-
ing, pity is different from empathy, as pity is related to a clear dis-
tinction between the self and the other, while empathy is a result 
of an identification with the other (Thomas et al., 2009). It is even 
more challenging to disentangle pity from sympathy. Leach et al. 
(2002) proposed that sympathy is a result of the appraisal of the 
intergroup situation as illegitimate and stable, while pity is based 
on the appraisal of a legitimate and stable situation without much 
prospect for social change. In contrast, outrage has been identified 
as the strongest mobilizing emotion, as it is an emotional response 
to an illegitimate and unstable situation. We argue that indeed pity 
comes as a response to a stable status difference, but we question 
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the assumption that pity is related to the legitimization of the status 
difference, and therefore unrelated to social change motivations.
Nevertheless, we differentiated between pity and sympathy, as 
the latter involves a dual focus and perceived similarity of the self 
and the other. For example, sympathy includes pity for the other's 
suffering and a worry whether one can avoid a similar situation 
(Smith, 2000). Pity, in contrast, is a clearly other-focused emo-
tion, when someone feels sorrow about the misfortune of others 
(Lazarus, 1991), therefore we found it a relevant emotion in connec-
tion with economically marginalized outgroups from the perspective 
of advantaged participants.
1.4 | Pity and behavioral intentions
Pity can lead to action for both egoistic and altruistic reasons. 
When pity is connected to an increased arousal that people aim to 
reduce by alleviating the suffering of others (Dijker, 2001; Wispé, 
1991), this can be understood as a self-focused or egoistic motiva-
tion. In contrast, according to the Batsonian view, “empathic con-
cern” motivates altruistic behavior without egoism (Batson, 2010; 
Batson & Ahmad, 2009, Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002). In 
this sense empathic concern does not require identification with 
the other (in contrast to other, above-mentioned interpretations 
of empathy). The perception of others’ needs leads to the impetus 
to act (Batson, Ahmad, & Stocks, 2016), in line with our conceptu-
alization of pity.
Florian et al. (1999) explored three different facets of pity from the 
perspective of focus and action: self-other and double focus. Self-focus 
and double focus (on self and the other) had negative consequences for 
behavioral outcomes (e.g., avoidance) whereas pity with other- focus 
was related to altruistic attitudes and behavior. Another study differ-
entiated between altruistic (selfless) and cynical (self-focused) pity, 
highlighting that focus on the other (and not on the self) is linked to al-
truistic behavior (Lunardo & Bezençon, 2015). This evidence suggests 
that pity can involve an other-oriented, altruistic component.
We propose that when economic deprivation of a group is inevi-
table, pity is an adequate, “good enough” intergroup emotion by high-
er-status group members in terms of mobilizing them for supportive 
action. As with other prosocial emotions, such as sympathy, which has 
been linked to collective action, pity is also a possible predictor not 
only of donations, but also of political action on behalf of economically 
and politically marginalized groups (e.g., poor people or refugees). In 
contrast, in relation to politically disadvantaged groups (e.g., sexual 
minorities), in the absence of economic hardships, and with a smaller 
status difference between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, 
pity is less adequate and less tailored to the needs of these groups, 
and therefore a more paternalistic emotional response. However, 
previous studies hardly investigated the possible role of pity in col-
lective action. Besides the role of anger and outrage, only sympa-
thy and empathy were identified as antecedents of collective action 
(Fernando, Kashima, & Laham, 2014; Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; 
Leach et al., 2002; Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015).
1.5 | Hypotheses
We expect that the presence or absence of economic disadvan-
tage influences the perception, emotion, and action intention of 
potential allies. Our question is whether pity can be a mobilizing 
emotional response for ally collective action on behalf of economi-
cally disadvantaged outgroups. We assume that these groups will 
be perceived to be vulnerable based on their economic depriva-
tion, and they induce genuine prosocial emotions that can motivate 
ally behaviors both in the form of donation and collective action.
1. Injustice awareness about economically and politically margin-
alized groups would have an indirect effect via both outrage 
and pity on behavioral intentions.
2. We expected that pity—similarly to outrage—would predict both 
donation and collective action intentions on behalf of groups that 
are both economically and politically disadvantaged.
F I G U R E  1   Hypothetical moderated 
mediation model predicting donation and 
collective action intentions toward groups 
with different types of disadvantages
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3. Pity would be a weaker predictor compared to outrage of collec-
tive action intention on behalf of groups that are politically disad-
vantaged, but economically not deprived.
In sum, disadvantage type (economic/political vs. only political) 
would moderate the effect of pity on collective action intention, 
with a similar effect of pity and outrage on collective action inten-
tion when considering combined economic and political disadvantage, 
and a smaller effect of pity compared to outrage in response to polit-
ical disadvantage. For a visual demonstration of our predictions, see 
Figure 1.
1.6 | Overview of the studies
We conducted a survey in Hungary related to the Roma minority 
(Study 1) and replicated our findings in connection with refugees 
in Germany (Study 2a) and in Hungary (Study 2b). We tested our 
predictions with the politically disadvantaged but economically 
not deprived gay group in Hungary (Study 3). Finally, we con-
ducted an experiment in which we compared the role of pity in 
ally collective action on behalf of an economically and politically 
disadvantaged versus a politically disadvantaged fictitious group 
(Study 4).
2  | STUDY 1
Roma people constitute the largest ethnic minority group in 
Hungary (Council of Europe, 2012). They are targets of dis-
crimination, affected by poverty and unemployment and sub-
ject to demographic and institutional segregation (Farkas, 2014; 
Feischmidt, Szombati, & Szuhay, 2013). Anti-Roma prejudice is 
widespread and often blatantly expressed (Kende, Hadarics, & 
Lášticová, 2017). In this context, positive attitudes and engage-
ment in prosocial action is counter-normative and highly politi-
cized. Because of the structural disadvantages of the Roma, allies 
are important in fulfilling the group's material needs and partici-
pating in their political struggles.
2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Participants and procedure
We conducted an online survey in 2016 as part of an omnibus re-
search in Hungary (N = 1,007). Participants were recruited by a sur-
vey company that offered a raffle price for participation. We used a 
multi-step, proportionally stratified sampling method of an online 
participant pool resulting in a sample demographically similar to the 
Hungarian population in terms of age, gender, and type of settle-
ment; however, they were somewhat better educated than average. 
N = 1,000 is typically used in opinion poll surveys relying on 
representative samples of Hungarian society (see Poll of polls, 2018). 
The language of the questionnaire was Hungarian. Based on the out-
lier analysis of SPSS, we had no outliers or extreme responses from 
the mean of either of the variables used in the path model.1
Fifty-one percent of participants were women, mean age was 
41.5 (SD = 13) years; 39% had a higher education degree, 46.1% fin-
ished secondary school, 2.9% did not finish secondary school and 
11.6% chose “other” option; 19% lived in Budapest, 54% in smaller 
towns, and 27% in a village.
We conducted all the statistical analysis using IBM SPSS ver-
sion 22.0 and AMOS (Arbuckle, 2011). We report all measures 
and data exclusions related to the research question. We con-
ducted the studies with the IRB approval of ELTE Eötvös Loránd 
University, Budapest, Hungary. The manuscript adheres to ethical 
guidelines specified in the APA Code of Conduct as well as au-
thors' national ethics guidelines.
2.1.2 | Measures
We used brief self-report measures on appraisals, emotions and ac-
tion intentions. In all measures 7-point Likert-type scales were used 
(from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely agree), unless oth-
erwise indicated. The list of all items is presented in Appendix A. 
Injustice awareness was measured by two items.2 Emotions were 
measured by single items in the following way: “If you think of the 
situation of Roma in Hungary, to what extent do you feel…? Pity; 
Outrage” (we translated the Hungarian word “sajnálat” as pity 
throughout). Donation intentions were measured by two items and 
collective action by four items.
2.2 | Results
2.2.1 | Descriptive statistics
Injustice awareness, pity, outrage, donation intentions and collec-
tive action intentions were low, suggesting overall negative at-
titudes toward the Roma. All the variables were correlated with 
a medium to large effect size, except for the correlation between 
outrage and donation intentions, with a small effect size. For 
scale reliabilities, means and correlations between variables, see 
Table 1.
 1We used a boxplot which indicates interquartile range (IQR) computed from Tukey's 
hinges. Values between 1.5 and 3 IQR from the end of the box indicate outliers, and over 
3 IQR indicate extreme responses.
 2A limitation of this measure is that injustice perception is not explicit in these items, 
only a perception of outgroup disadvantage. However, in the hostile intergroup context 
in which the study was conducted, where the majority of the population shows blatant 
prejudice, we expected that the acknowledgement of outgroup disadvantage inherently 
would express injustice appraisal, therefore we handled this measure as equivalent to the 
injustice awareness measures of the other studies, and they functioned very similarly 
indeed.
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2.2.2 | Hypothesis testing
To test the connection between injustice awareness, emotions, and 
behavioral intentions, we used path analysis, which is an extension 
of multiple linear regression allowing the test of indirect or mediated 
effects (Streiner, 2006), enabling us to test our hypothesized linear 
model. We did not rely on latent variable models, because each con-
struct was measured by a single scale or item.
We worked with the assumption that all variables would be 
associated; however, we expected that their connections would 
have different magnitudes. We applied the model building/model 
trimming technique (see e.g., Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005), 
with a Maximum Likelihood estimation method. We first built a 
saturated model and trimmed (or erased) non-significant paths 
to build a model that reflects our data in the most parsimonious 
way. We conducted data imputation to substitute missing values 
for the mediation analysis, so we tested if pity and outrage func-
tion as mediators between injustice awareness and behavioral 
intentions.
Additionally, we conducted a direct comparison between the 
outrage–collective action intentions path and the pity–collective 
action intentions path, to test if there is a significant difference 
between the emotions as predictors. In addition, to test the spe-
cial importance of the path between pity and collective action, 
we erased this path with the expectation that model fit would 
deteriorate.




α/r (in case of two 
items) Mean SD
Correlation
1 2 3 4 5
1. Donation intentions 2 .854 3.10 1.80 1 .657** .480** .545** .195**
2. Collective action 
intentions
4 .891 2.49 1.522 1 .544** .528** .311**
3. Injustice awareness 2 .680 3.14 1.88 1 .544** .254**
4. Pity 1 Single item 3.02 1.90 1 .412**
5. Outrage 1 Single item 3.46 2.01 1
**p < .001. 
F I G U R E  2   Predictors of collective 
action and donation intentions toward the 
Roma in Hungary in Study 1
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The path between outrage and donation intention was not signif-
icant in the first model (B = −.04; SE = .03; p = .105; β = −.05), and it 
was therefore removed. The trimmed model showed good fit to our 
data (see Table 3). Injustice awareness more strongly predicted pity 
(B = .55; SE = .03; p < .001; β = .54) than outrage (B = .27; SE = .03; 
p < .001; β = .25). Injustice awareness was directly connected to 
both collective action intentions (B = .29; SE = .02; p < .001; β = .36) 
and donation intentions (B = .26; SE = .03; p < .001; β = .26). Pity 
was an even stronger (B = .23; SE = .03; p < .001; β = .28) predic-
tor of collective action than outrage (B = .09; SE = .02; p < .001; 
β = .12). Donation intention was predicted only by pity (B = .39; 
SE = .03; p < .001; β = .40). Pity and outrage had a positive connec-
tion (β = .34; p < .001); and collective action intentions and donation 
intentions, too (β = .48; p < .001). For a visual presentation of our 
results, see Figure 2.
To reveal whether intergroup emotions would convey an indirect 
effect of injustice awareness on donation and collective action in-
tentions, a mediation analysis was conducted with the bootstrapping 
technique suggested by Macho and Ledermann (2011), where we re-
quested 95% confidence intervals using 2000 re-samples. We found 
that both pity and outrage were significant mediators between 
injustice awareness and collective action intentions. For the results 
of the mediation analysis, see Table 2.
The path between outrage and collective action intention was 
significantly weaker than between pity and collective action inten-
tion (t = 4.41, df = 2, p < .001). When we removed the path between 
pity and collective action intention, model fit indices were wors-
ened significantly (for fit indices of the original model and without 
the path between feeling pity and collective action, see Table 3). All 
models reported in the article have been identified (with degrees of 
freedom equal to or higher than zero).
2.3 | Discussion of Study 1
Our hypothesis that injustice awareness had an indirect effect via 
pity and outrage on donation and collective action intentions was 
supported. Outrage and collective action were strongly correlated 
in previous studies (Thomas & McGarty, 2009), where the target 
groups were socially and politically disadvantaged, but not neces-
sarily economically deprived. In this study, however, pity as an ex-
pression of the acknowledgement of economic deprivation was the 
Model B p
95% CI lower 
bound
95% CI upper 
bound
Study 1 Roma 
people
Outrage—CA .03 <.001 0.02 0.04
Outrage—Donation – – – –
Pity—CA .12 <.001 0.10 0.16
Pity—Donation .21 <.001 0.18 0.26
Study 2a Refugees Outrage—CA – – – –
Outrage—Donation – – – –
Pity—CA .20 <.001 0.12 0.28
Pity—Donation .33 <.001 0.25 0.43
Study 2b Refugees Outrage—CA .02 <.001 0.01 0.03
Outrage—Donation .03 .002 0.01 0.03
Pity—CA .21 <.001 0.19 0.23
Pity—Donation .32 <.001 0.30 0.34
Study 3 Gay 
people
Outrage—CA .19 <.001 0.16 0.21
Outrage—Donation .19 <.001 0.17 0.22
Pity—CA .11 <.001 0.10 0.13





Outrage—CA .15 .012 0.05 0.22
Outrage—Donation – – – –
Pity—CA .22 .014 0.13 0.32
Pity -Donation .36 .007 0.25 0.50
Study 4 Politically 
disadvantageda 
Outrage—CA .32 .005 0.24 0.44
Outrage—Donation .25 .008 0.14 0.38
Pity—CA .13 .007 0.05 0.25
Pity—Donation .11 .080 −0.01 0.23
aWe used the three-item pity measure for the mediation analysis. 
TA B L E  2   Results of mediation analysis 
between injustice awareness, outrage 
and pity, as mediators and behavioral 
intentions (collective action and donation)
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stronger predictor of these actions. This may be explained by the 
absence of an injustice scenario in this study (common in collective 
action research) that could have evoked outrage, whereas the other-
focused emotion of pity could be more generally present among 
participants.
3  | STUDY 2
We intended to replicate our findings in connection with refugees in 
Germany and in Hungary. Similarly to the Roma, refugees in Europe 
need the assistance of volunteers to fulfill their basic needs for re-
sources and safety, but they also need political support in the repre-
sentation of their interests. Refugees have multiple disadvantages, 
such as linguistic difficulties, lacking documentation of professional 
qualifications and relevant work experience (Trines, 2017), and being 
targets of prejudice (see e.g., Osborne, 2016; von der Mark, 2016). 
The pro-refugee movement underlines that people can engage in 
prosocial action on behalf of refugees, in the forms of donations, 
volunteering and political activism (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016).
We collected data from a German sample in Study 2a to improve 
the generalizability of our findings by looking at a different soci-
etal context in which prosocial intentions were more widespread 
and normative (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011). At the time of 
our data collection in 2016, the official policy regarding refugees in 
Germany was mostly accepting, and pro-refugee volunteers acted in 
line with the dominant social norms of the country (Verkaik, 2017). 
In Study 2b our goal was to replicate Study 2a with a representative 
sample in the Hungarian context where, in contrast to Germany, the 
government took an openly hostile stance against refugees and im-
migrants. Given the different sampling strategies our focus here is 
on comparing relationships not mean levels of responses.
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants and procedure
In Study 2a, data were collected at a German university with the 
assistance of students in 2016 by an online survey using conveni-
ence sampling (N = 191). We found no outliers based on the out-
lier analysis of SPSS from the mean of variables used in the path 
model.
Fifty percent of participants were women, and their mean age 
was 36.9 (SD = 14) years; 43.5% had a secondary school degree, 
38.2% university degree; 18.3% did not respond. The sample size 
was suboptimal for a path model, as the optimal number of partici-
pants is determined as being higher than 200 (Kline, 2015). However, 
others suggest that 10:1 ratio of cases to free parameters is accept-
able (Bentler & Chou, 1987), especially for simple models like ours. 
Besides, we had to work with the available data collected at one time 
point, as the changing political situation and policies did not allow us 
to extend the data collection period.
In Study 2b we conducted an online survey as part of an omnibus 
research project in Hungary in 2018, relying on a sample recruited 
with an identical method to that in Study 1. The sample was ran-
domly split and the other half or respondents completed a different 
survey, resulting in N = 563. Fifty-two percent of participants were 
women, their mean age was 41.5 (SD = 13) years; 34.3% of partici-
pants had a degree in higher education, 62.7% had finished second-
ary school, 3% had not finished secondary school; 16.3% lived in 
Budapest, 54.9% lived in smaller towns, and 28.1% in a village and 
0.7% abroad.
We had four outliers from the mean of ally collective action in-
tention, but this number was low compared to sample size, so we 
kept them in the analysis.
TA B L E  3   Changes of the Chi square, degrees of freedom and model indices by erasing the path between pity and collective action 
intentions in each model
Model χ2 df CFI NFI RMSEA SRMR Δχ2 Δdf
p (Δχ2-
tests)
Study 1 Roma people Original 2.62 1 0.999 0.998 0.040 0.011 80.17 1 <.001
Erased 82.79 2 0.953 0.952 0.200 0.052
Study 2a Refugees Original 2.62 3 1 0.995 0.000 0.041 27.62 1 <.001
Erased 30.23 4 0.951 0.945 0.186 0.054
Study 2b Refugees Original 0.00 0 1 1 0.545 0.000 714.36 1 <.001
Erased 714.36 1 1.957 0.957 0.356 0.055
Study 3 Gay people Original 3.18 1 0.998 0.998 0.083 0.014 4.81 1 .090
Erased 7.99 2 0.996 0.995 0.076 0.021
Study 4 Economically 
and politically 
disadvantaged**,a
Original 4.82 3 0.996 0.991 0.045 0.018 29.8 1 <.001
Erased 34.62 4 0.939 0.933 0.159 0.075
Study 4 Politically 
disadvantaged**,a
Original 4.56 2 0.995 0.992 0.065 0.018 9.54 1 .023
Erased 14.10 3 0.979 0.974 0.111 0.037
aWe used the three-item pity measure. 
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3.1.2 | Measures
All items are presented in Appendix A. Injustice awareness was 
measured more directly compared to Study 1, by five new items. 
Pity and outrage were measured with single items again. Donation 
intention was measured by three items, also more directly. Collective 
action intention was measured by four items reacting to the follow-
ing scenario: “Imagine that a great number of refugees have to move 
to your neighborhood. What is the likelihood that you would par-
ticipate in the following actions?” The response scale in all measures 
ranged from 1 = I do not agree at all, to 7 = I completely agree. The 
language of the questionnaire in Study 2a was German, and in Study 
2b it was Hungarian.
3.2 | Results of Study 2a
3.2.1 | Descriptive statistics
Injustice awareness, and pity were close to the midpoint of the scale, 
while donation and collective action intentions were low. Outrage 
about the refugee policy was high. Results showed that all elements 
of the model were significantly correlated, with outrage as an excep-
tion. Outrage was negatively correlated with pity, but it was not as-
sociated with any other variables. For scale reliabilities, means, and 
correlations see Table 4.
3.2.2 | Hypothesis testing
Again, we used the model trimming method. Outrage had no signifi-
cant connections in the model, so we trimmed the non-significant 
paths between injustice awareness and outrage (B = .09; SE = .09; 
p = .317; β = .07), outrage and collective action intentions (B = .04; 
SE = .04; p = .414; β = .02), and outrage and donation intentions 
(B = .05; SE = .04; p = .105; β = .05). The resulting trimmed model, 
illustrated in Figure 3, showed good fit (see Table 3).
Injustice awareness was connected to both collective action in-
tentions (B = .82; SE = .06; p < .001; β = .66) and donation intentions 
(B = .42; SE = .06; p < .001; β = .39). Injustice awareness was a strong 
predictor of pity (B = .72; SE = .07; p < .001; β = .60), and pity was a 
stronger predictor of donation intention (B = .45; SE = .05; p < .001; 
β = .51) than of collective action intentions (B = 0.27; SE = .05; p < .001; 
β = .26). Pity and outrage had a negative connection (β = −.34; p < .001); 
and collective action intentions and donation intentions had a positive 
connection (β = .28; p < .001). Pity was a significant mediator between 
injustice awareness and collective action intentions (see Table 2).
The path between pity and collective action intention was signifi-
cantly higher than between outrage and collective action (t = 3.82, 
df = 378, p < .001). By trimming the path between feeling pity and 
collective action intention, the model fit significantly decreased (see 
Table 3).
3.3 | Results of Study 2b
3.3.1 | Descriptive statistics
All study variables were significantly correlated. Pity and outrage 
were close to the midpoint, while injustice awareness and behavioral 
intentions were lower. The correlation between injustice awareness 
and pity was strong, as was the correlation between pity and behav-
ioral intentions too. The connection between outrage and behavioral 
intentions was weaker. For scale reliabilities, means and correlations 
between variables, see Table 5.
3.3.2 | Hypothesis testing
All connections between variables were significant, therefore we 
kept the saturated model with perfect fit this time (see Figure 4). 
Injustice awareness was connected to both collective action inten-
tions (B = .41, SE = .01; p < .001; β = .43) and donation intentions 
(B = .52, SE = .01; p < .001; β = .46). Pity was a predictor of both 
donation intentions (B = .38, SE = .01; p < .001; β = .42) and col-
lective action intentions (B = .26, SE = .01; p < .001; β = .33). Pity 
and outrage had a positive connection (B = .35, SE = .03 p < .001; 
β = .15); and collective action intentions and donation intentions also 
TA B L E  4   Scale reliabilities, scale points, means, standard deviations and correlations in Study 2a (all scales are 7-point)
Number of 
items
α/r (in case of two 
items) M SD
Correlation
1 2 3 4 5
1. Donation intentions 3 .901 3.30 2.02 1 .738** .687** .734** −.041
2. Collective action 
intentions
4 .969 3.04 2.32 1 .816** .650** .017
3. Injustice awareness 4 .760 3.76 1.88 1 .585** .072
4. Pity 1 Single item 3.98 2.25 1 −.231**
5. Outrage 1 Single item 5.03 2.20 1
**p < .001. 
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had a positive connection (B = .47, SE = .01 p < .001; β = .52). Pity, 
again, was a significant mediator between injustice awareness and 
collective action intention (see Table 2).
Here too, the path between pity and collective action intentions 
was stronger than the path between outrage and collective action 
(t = 17.11, df = 1, p < .001). We found a significant decrease in model 
fit when erasing the path between pity and collective action inten-
tions (see Table 3).
3.4 | Discussion of Study 2
In both samples, pity was a stronger predictor of collective action 
intention than was outrage, replicating the pattern in Study 1. The 
results from a different intergroup context and from two different 
countries strengthen our assumption that in the cases of both eco-
nomically and politically marginalized groups, pity can play an impor-
tant role in prosocial action.
However, we must note an unexpected finding that in Study 2a 
outrage had a connection neither with injustice awareness nor with 
collective action intention. The most feasible explanation for this result 
is the specific context of Germany at the time of data collection. The 
item measuring outrage may have been ambiguous because people 
could perceive the policies as either too supportive or not supportive 
enough. Unfortunately, we had no way to confirm this interpretation 
in the current study. In contrast, in Study 2b, outrage was connected 
to injustice awareness, indicating that outrage about the refugee pol-
icy in Hungary reflected a pro-refugee stand among respondents.
F I G U R E  3   Predictors of collective 
action and donation intentions toward 
refugees in Germany in Study 2a
TA B L E  5   Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations and correlations in Study 2b (all scales are 7-point)
Number of 
items α M SD
Correlation
1 2 3 4 5
1. Donation intentions 2 .922 2.92 1.67 1 .793** .745** .727** .450**
2. Collective action 
intentions
4 .757 2.81 1.35 1 .666** .629** .420**
3. Injustice awareness 4 .820 3.29 1.41 1 .636** .521**
4. Pity 1 Single item 3.65 1.84 1 .428**
5. Outrage 1 Single item 3.79 1.95 1
**p < .001. 
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4  | STUDY 3
We contend that the mobilizing function of pity would be different for 
groups that are politically disadvantaged, but do not suffer severe eco-
nomic hardships. Therefore, we tested our model in connection with gay 
people. Sexual minorities, similarly to the Roma and refugees, are targets 
of social and political disadvantages connected to prejudice and discrimi-
nation (Calcagno, 2016; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008), but 
unlike these groups, they do not uniformly suffer economic deprivation 
(McGarrity & Huebner, 2013). In line with this, they may be perceived as 
a more competent and agentic group (see Cuddy et al., 2007), therefore 
feeling pity, a reaction to the group's suffering, may be less relevant than 
outrage in predicting collective action intentions. For example, empathy 
was not a significant mediator between intergroup contact and ally col-
lective action for LGBT people (Fingerhut, 2011). Furthermore, pity may 
express undesirable paternalistic attitudes that hinder political action in-
tentions (Russell & Bohan, 2016). In line with this, we altered our predic-
tion of the model in relation to support for gay people. We maintained 
our prediction regarding injustice awareness, but expected that outrage 
would predict collective action intentions more strongly than pity.
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants and procedure
For an estimation of sample size for the path model, G*Power 
analysis suggested N = 311 for 95% power to detect a small effect 
size of Cohen's f2 = 0.02 (Cohen, 1988), which we set as the mini-
mum number. We used a university pool consisting of students 
from all faculties of a state university in Hungary, where they 
received course credit for participation. We reached a higher 
sample size than planned (N = 475); 76.2% of participants were 
women, and their average age was 21.06 (SD = 2.2) years.
4.1.2 | Measures
Measures were identical to those in Study 2 but tailored to 
the target group of gay people (see Appendix A). We are aware 
that the category “gay people” (melegek in Hungarian) is re-
strictive, but decided to use the term which is the most com-
monly applied label in Hungarian for sexual minorities (used 




All variables were significantly correlated, but the connections be-
tween pity and behavioral outcomes were weaker, compared to the 
connections between outrage and behavioral outcomes. For scale 
reliabilities, means and correlations, see Table 6. There were no out-
liers and extreme responses.
F I G U R E  4   Predictors of collective 
action and donation intentions toward 
refugees in Hungary in Study 2b
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4.2.2 | Hypothesis testing
The only non-significant path we removed from the model was between 
pity and donation intentions (B = .07; SE = .04; p = .062; β = .08). The re-
sulting trimmed model (Figure 5) showed good fit to our data (see Table 3).
Injustice awareness was connected to both collective action inten-
tions (B = .73; SE = .05; p < .001; β = .60) and donation intentions 
(B = .48; SE = .06; p < .001; β = .42). Outrage was a predictor of both 
donation intentions (B = .24; SE = .05; p < .001; β = .25) and collective 
action intentions (B = .23; SE = .04; p < .001; β = .23). There was a weak 
connection between pity and collective action intentions (B = .05; 
SE = .02; p = .033; β = .05). Pity and outrage had a positive connection 
(B = .58; SE = .10 p < .001; β = .26); and collective action intentions and 
donation intentions too (B = .96; SE = .08 p < .001; β = .65). Injustice 
awareness had a significant effect on collective action intention via 
both pity and outrage. For the mediation analysis, see Table 2.
The path between outrage and collective action intentions was 
significantly stronger, compared to the path between pity and collec-
tive action intentions (t = 3.75, df = 946, p < .001). This time, when 
erasing the path between pity and collective action intention, there 
was no significant decrease in model fit, in contrast to all previous 
models with economically disadvantaged target groups (see Table 3).
4.3 | Discussion of Study 3
As expected, outrage was a stronger predictor of behavioral inten-
tions than pity in the context of relations to gay people. Surprisingly, 
TA B L E  6   Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations and correlations in Study 3 (all scales are 7-point)
Number of 
items α/r M SD
Correlation
1 2 3 4 5
1. Donation intentions 2 .846 3.26 1.73 1 .803** .594** .341** .535**
2. Collective action 
intentions
4 .757 3.91 1.83 1 .776** .423** .654**
3. Injustice awareness 4 .949 4.90 1.51 1 .401** .674**
4. Pity 1 Single item 3.60 1.78 1 .449**
5. Outrage 1 Single item 3.82 1.82 1
**p < .001. 
F I G U R E  5   Predictors of collective 
action and donation intentions toward gay 
people in Hungary in Study 3
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outrage was not only a predictor of collective action intentions, but 
also of donation intentions, while this connection was not present in 
the models of marginalized groups of Study 1 and 2. This suggests 
that among those reporting outrage, both forms of action can ex-
press support on behalf of the outgroup.
Injustice awareness had a weaker connection to pity and pity did 
not relate to donation intentions, which suggests that, in this par-
ticular intergroup context, pity is not linked to donation intentions. 
Compared to the previous studies pity had a much smaller role in 
predicting behavioral outcomes, as indicated by the lack of signifi-
cant decrease in model fit after removing this path from the model.
5  | STUDY 4
In Studies 1–3 we examined the connection between pity and col-
lective action intentions compared to outrage in connection with dif-
ferent groups using cross-sectional survey data. The strength of our 
surveys was that we measured attitudes and action intentions toward 
real groups across different contexts ensuring high external validity. 
We relied on the assumption that perceived economic hardship is a 
meaningful source of the difference when it comes to the role of pity 
in mobilization. However, we did not directly measure whether the 
difference was connected to the groups experiencing different forms 
of disadvantages. In a new study we wanted to demonstrate that the 
different functions of pity on ally action are indeed dependent on the 
type of disadvantage. Furthermore, we did not have evidence about 
the causal relationship between pity and collective action intentions. 
Using an experimental design we could test perceptions of a causal 
connection between emotion and action. Furthermore, we extended 
the measure of pity from a one-item measure to three items, so that we 
could test the effect of different but related emotion labels.
In our study we manipulated (a) the type of disadvantage and (b) 
the emotional reaction of a fictitious ally to economic and political 
versus only political disadvantage. We tested participants’ attribu-
tions of action intention to the fictitious ally, which highlighted their 
expectations of how emotions and behavioral intentions are related 
in specific contexts. We also tested their own emotional reaction to 
the situation and their consequent ally collective action intentions.
5.1 | Hypotheses
In line with our overall hypothesis, but adapted to the specific proce-
dure of the experiment, we expected that when participants had to 
evaluate a fictitious character's ally action intentions in a situation in 
which the outgroup was only politically disadvantaged, they would at-
tribute higher collective action intentions when the character showed 
outrage and lower intentions when he showed pity. However, we ex-
pected no differences between pity and outrage in their effect on col-
lective action intentions when the outgroup was both economically 
and politically disadvantaged (H1). We also expected that their own 
emotional reaction of outrage, but not pity, would predict intentions to 
engage in ally action when the outgroup is politically (but not economi-
cally) disadvantaged, but no such differences would be found when the 
outgroup is both politically and economically disadvantaged (H2).
5.2 | Method
5.2.1 | Procedure
In an online experiment, participants were randomly assigned into 
one of four conditions based on disadvantage type (economic and 
political vs. political) and emotion (pity vs. outrage). We introduced 
an imaginary country, Anduria, where there is a divide between city 
and village inhabitants. Villagers suffer either economic (deprivation 
of basic needs) and political disadvantages (violation of rights) at the 
same time, or only political disadvantages (for a detailed description 
of the vignettes see Appendix B). We framed our story as a news 
item, accompanied by an illustration that was shared on Facebook by 
an Andurian citizen from the city (i.e., a potential ally to village inhab-
itants). To manipulate the emotions related to the story, the Andurian 
citizen shared the news with a comment that stated either his pity or 
outrage about the situation. To reinforce the message, the comment 
was followed either by a sad or an angry emoji.
5.2.2 | Participants
For an estimation of sample size for the path model, we relied on 
the same calculation as in Study 3, but we aimed to reach as high a 
sample size as possible to increase the reliability of the results. First, 
we recruited participants on Facebook (n = 287) and offered a raffle 
price of vouchers of 12,000 HUF (37 Euros). We posted the call on 
Facebook pages and groups. Second, we recruited participants from 
a university course (n = 316).
We had 304 participants in the economic and political condition, 
and 299 participants in the political condition, reaching a total of 
N = 603. We excluded only those participants who quit the question-
naire before responding to our main outcome measure, ally collective 
action intention. We had seven outliers that deviated from the mean 
of injustice awareness, 11 outliers on the scale of prosocial emotions 
and no outliers in the scale of outrage. We had eight outliers in ally 
collective action, and five outliers in donation intentions. As the sam-
ple size was big enough, we kept them in the analysis.
Seventy four percent of participant (449) were women, 25% men 
(140), and 14 did not report their gender or chose “other”. The vast 
majority of respondents were university students. The average age 
was 26.2 years (SD = 9.8). The majority of respondents, 49.8%, were 
from the capital, 34.3% came from another city or town, and 14.3% 
came from a village, and 1.6 % did not respond.3
 3As those living in villages might be more personally involved by our fictitious scenario, 
we conducted a T-test to see if there is a difference based on the residential status of 
participants in injustice awareness, emotions, and collective action intentions, but we did 
not find any difference between groups.
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5.2.3 | Measures
We used a manipulation check to test if participants identified eco-
nomic and political disadvantage in each condition. We also used an at-
tention check question to see if respondents could recall our fictitious 
character's emotional reaction. Injustice awareness was measured by 
the same four items as in Study 3, tailored to the fictitious scenario.
We asked about emotional response in the following way “Imagine 
that you are also a citizen of Anduria living in one of the main cities. If 
you think of the situation of village inhabitants to what extent do the fol-
lowing emotions describe what you feel?” We listed pity, sadness, and 
sympathy. Pity was previously conceptualized as having the element of 
sadness, according to multiple authors, such as Cuddy et al. (2007, p. 
635), who state that pity consists of compassion and sadness. A study by 
Florian et al. (1999) also empirically supported that the experience of pity 
was highly related to sadness and sorrow, but also to sympathy. We ex-
pected that sympathy is a somewhat more positive emotion compared to 
pity, but this measure allowed us to test the effects of the different emo-
tion labels separately, and also as aggregated variables. We also created a 
scale for outrage, using the words anger, wrath, and outrage.
We first asked about how the fictitious character would act. We 
used the same collective action and donation measures as in Study 2 
and 3 and tailored them to the context of Anduria. Finally, we asked 
participants about their own collective action and donation intentions 
if they were city inhabitants of Anduria. For scale reliabilities, see 
Table 7. For the list of items tailored to the experiment, see Appendix A.
5.3 | Results
5.3.1 | Attention and manipulation checks
We did not find a difference in the perception of political disad-
vantage between the conditions (Economic condition: M = 6.25, 
SD = 0.87; Political condition: M = 6.24, SD = 0.93, t(596) = 0.22, 
p = .825), but we did in the perception of economic disadvan-
tage (Economic condition: M = 6.25 SD = 0.74; Political condi-
tion: M = 3.69, SD = 1.55, t(596) = 25.76, p < .001). We found 
no differences in injustice awareness between the economic and 
political and only political conditions, and we had a ceiling effect 
in both cases (Economic condition: M = 6.01, SD = 0.84; Political 
condition: M = 6.03, SD = 0.87, t(594) = 1.05, p = .294).
Attention checks showed that not all participants noticed the ma-
nipulated emotions or could recall them correctly. In the pity condition, 
20 (6.3%) wrongly indicated outrage and 53 (16.7%) could not recall the 
emotion. In the outrage condition, 17 (5.9%) wrongly indicated pity, and 
36 (12.5%) could not recall the emotion. Four (1.3%) participants’ re-
sponses were missing in both conditions. As 134 out of 603 participants 
could not precisely indicate the appropriate emotion, we tested our hy-
potheses with the exclusion of these people. This left us with a sample 
of 469 participants, 240 in the pity, and 229 in the outrage condition.
5.3.2 | Descriptive statistics
For means, standard deviations and correlations in the full sample, see 
Table 7. Attributed collective action and donation intentions were high 
overall, and participants’ own action intentions were somewhat lower, 
but still above the midpoint. Injustice awareness was very high, cor-
responding to our goal to present a story with high level of injustice. 
Attributed action intentions to the fictitious character strongly corre-
lated with participants’ own action intentions. Injustice awareness and 
own emotions were strongly associated with participants’ own action 
intentions, and only weakly connected to attributed action intentions.
5.3.3 | Hypothesis testing with ANOVA and planned 
comparisons
As we expected that the emotion manipulations would have an 
effect on the attribution of behavioral intention to the fictitious 
character (but not on participants’ own collective action), we con-
ducted a two-way ANOVA for the effect of disadvantage type 
(economic and political vs. only political) and emotion (pity vs. 
outrage) on attributed collective action intention. We found no 
significant main effect of disadvantage type, reinforcing that the 
TA B L E  7   Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations and correlations of all variables in Study 4 (all scales are 7-point)
Number 
of items α M SD
Correlation
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. Attributed collective action 
intentions
5 .862 4.99 1.13 1 .589** .397** .176** .283** .181** .144*
2. Attributed donation intentions 3 .808 4.77 1.16 1 .249** .439** .211** .177** .155*
3. Collection action intentions 5 .821 4.63 1.16 1 .561** .347** .496** .542**
4. Donation intentions 3 .798 4.65 1.29 1 .226** .457** .405**
5. Injustice awareness 4 .742 6.07 0.86 1 .489** .473**
6. Pity 3 .801 5.29 1.12 1 .656**
7. Outrage 3 .905 4.66 1.47 1
**p < .001. 
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two scenarios did not differ in their mobilization for collective ac-
tion. There was a significant main effect of emotion on collective 
action intentions. We found no interaction effect between disad-
vantage type and emotion. For donation intentions, the main ef-
fect of both disadvantage type and emotion was significant, but 
there was no interaction between conditions. For results of the 
ANOVA, see Table 8.
We conducted planned comparisons between the emotion 
conditions to compare the effects on attributed collective action, 
separately within the economic scenario and within the political 
scenario. We chose paired comparisons, because our hypotheses 
focused on the comparison of the two emotions in the two contexts 
independently.
There was no difference in attributed collective action intention 
between the pity condition and the outrage condition in the eco-
nomic disadvantage scenario. In the political scenario, attributed 
collective action intention was higher in the outrage condition com-
pared to the pity condition.4 For descriptive statistics and results of 
the T-tests, see Table 9.
In summary, ANOVA analysis highlighted that pity and outrage 
had significantly different effects on attributed collective action, 
and planned comparisons specified that the difference was signif-
icant only in the political, but not in the economic condition. We 
expected the changing role of pity and the same role of outrage 
throughout the contexts, therefore we did not expect and did not 
find an interaction between disadvantage type and emotion. In line 
with our expectation, donation intentions were higher in response to 
the economic/political disadvantage scenario.
5.3.4 | Hypothesis testing with path analysis
Based on participants’ own reaction to the economic and political 
versus political scenarios, we built the model the same way as in 
Studies 1–3, where injustice awareness predicted behavioral inten-
tions of donation and collective action, and the connection occurred 
via pity and outrage.
First, we tested whether participants’ own emotional re-
sponses were independent of the manipulation. Respondents’ own 
emotions were not affected by the presented emotional response 
of the fictitious ally (Pity: t(594) = 0.184, p = .854; Outrage: 
t(594) = −1.13, p = .261). On the basis of the random assignment 
and the lack of effect of this manipulation on their own emotional 
reaction, we were confident about comparing the role of their 
own emotional responses in predicting their own action intention 
responses. We conducted separate analyses on the subsamples 
in the combined economic and political and in the political only 
conditions.
First, we conducted the analysis with single item emotion mea-
sures (outrage and pity), similarly to the four correlational studies. 
Then, we used the three item-scale for prosocial emotions and con-
ducted the same path analysis. We conducted additional analysis for 
comparison with each single item (sadness, sympathy alone), and 
with combined items (pity/sadness and pity/sympathy, as a scale). 
We reported our results in the Figures S1–S3.
Path analysis with the 1 item measure (pity)
In the economic disadvantage condition, there were two non-signifi-
cant paths: between injustice awareness and collective action inten-
tion (B = 0.09; SE = .08; p = .277; β = .06), and between injustice 
awareness and donation intention (B = −0.06; SE = .09; p = .530; 
β = −.04), therefore we trimmed these two paths.
The trimmed model had good fit indices (see Table 3). Both emo-
tions were significant predictors of behavior intentions, but unlike 
the pattern in correlational data, outrage was a stronger predictor 
of collective action intention than pity. Pity, however, was a stronger 
predictor of donation intention than outrage. For the results of the 
mediation analysis, see Table 2.
In the political disadvantage condition, there were three non-sig-
nificant paths: between injustice awareness and collective action 
intention (B = 0.06; SE = .07; p = .385; β = .05), between injustice 
awareness and donation intention (B = −0.04; SE = .09; p = .674; 
β = −.03), and between pity and donation intention (B = 0.09; 
SE = .06; p = .131; β = .09).
The trimmed model had good fit indices (χ2 = 3.55; df = 3, 
CFI = 0.999, NFI = 0.992, RMSEA = 0.025). Both emotions were sig-
nificant predictors of behavior intentions, but in line with our predic-
tion, outrage was a stronger predictor of collective action intention 
than pity. Donation was only predicted by outrage, but not by pity.
Path analysis with a 3-item measure (pity, sympathy, sadness)
In the economic disadvantage condition, there were three non-
significant paths we trimmed: between injustice awareness and 
 4We ran the t-tests without the removal of participants who failed the manipulation 
check as well, and received similar results as in the full sample: no difference in collective 
action intention between pity and outrage in the economic condition (Pity: M = 4.98, 
SD = 1.09; Outrage: M = 5.02, SD = 1.14, t(302) = −0.351, p = .726, Cohen's d = 0.04), 
and a significant difference between emotions in the political condition (Pity: M = 4.77, 
SD = 1.19; Outrage: M = 5.19, SD = 1.07, t(297) = −3.12, p = .002, Cohen's d = 0.37).
TA B L E  8   Results of the two-way ANOVA testing the effects of 
disadvantage type (economic and political vs. political) and emotion 





Collective action intentions (N = 469)
Economic and 
political—Political
0.026 1 .871 .000
Pity—Outrage 11.85 1 .001 .025
Interaction 0.69 1 .407 .001
Donation intentions (N = 469)
Economic and 
political—Political
8.57 1 .004 .018
Pity—Outrage 8.10 1 .005 .017
Interaction 0.57 1 .450 .001
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collective action intention (B = 0.06; SE = .08; p = .430; β = .05), 
between injustice awareness and donation intention (B = −0.11; 
SE = .09; p = .219; β = −.07), and between and outrage and donation 
intention (B = 0.07 SE = .06; p = .225; β = .08). The model had good 
fit indices (see Table 3). Both emotions were significant predictors 
of behavior intentions, but pity more strongly predicted collective 
action intention than outrage. Pity was also a stronger predictor of 
donation intention than outrage. For the results of the mediation 
analysis, see Table 2.
In the political disadvantage condition, we trimmed the two 
non-significant paths between injustice awareness and collective 
action intention (B = 0.10; SE = .07; p = .176; β = .072) and between 
injustice awareness and donation intentions (B = −0.092; SE = .090; 
p = .308; β = −.06), and the resulting model had a good model fit (see 
Table 3). In this condition, outrage was a stronger predictor of collec-
tive action intention than pity. Outrage was also a stronger predictor 
of donation intention than pity. For the results of the mediation anal-
ysis, see Table 2. For a summary of findings of the path models (with 
1 and 3-item measures), see Figure 6.
In the additional path analyses with the different combinations 
of items, we found that two-item combinations (pity, sympathy and 
pity, sadness) provided the same pattern as the three-item solution. 
However, the one-item sadness measure (similarly to the one-item 
pity measure) was a weaker predictor of collective action intention 
compared to outrage, but the one-item sympathy measure was 
stronger than outrage on behalf of economically disadvantaged 
groups. The pattern for politically disadvantaged groups was more 
uniform (outrage being stronger than prosocial emotions). For the 
path models, see the Figures S1–S3.
5.3.5 | Comparison of paths
We compared the emotion-behavioral intention paths using the 
3-item scales for both pity and outrage. In the economic scenario, 
the path between pity and collective action intentions was stronger 
compared to the path between outrage and collective action inten-
tions (t = 2.11, df = 604, p = .03), while the opposite pattern occurred 
TA B L E  9   Planned comparisons between emotions on collective action intentions
Economic and political (n = 224) Independent samples T-test
M SD t df P Cohen's d
Pity 4.85 1.15 −1.81 302 .074 .22
Outrage 5.12 1.25
Political (n = 245) Independent samples T-test
M SD t df p Cohen's d
Pity 4.78 1.21 −3.11 243 .002 .39
Outrage 5.22 1.04
F I G U R E  6   Predictors of collective 
action and donation intentions toward 
economically and politically and only 
politically disadvantaged groups. The 
emotion of pity was measured by one, 
and three-items, indicated by two 
regression weights. The regression 
weights before the slash refer to the 
economic and political disadvantage 
condition, the regression weights after the 
slash refer to the political disadvantage 
condition [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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in the political scenario (t = 2.43, df = 594, p = .02). Erasing the path 
between pity and collective action intention deteriorated the model 
fit significantly in the economic scenario, while it changed fit indices 
to a smaller extent in the political scenario (with still a significant 
change in Chi square, but an acceptable CFI and NFI). For the com-
parison of fit indices, see Table 3.
5.4 | Discussion of Study 4
In line with our predictions, we found that pity and outrage were 
equally relevant emotions in the mobilization for collective action 
and donation in the case of an economically and politically disad-
vantaged outgroup. In contrast, in the case of an outgroup that was 
only politically, but not economically disadvantaged, outrage was a 
stronger predictor for collective action intention than pity. This pat-
tern was identified in the action intentions attributed to the ficti-
tious character, in line with findings of Study 1, 2, and 3.
When we looked at participants’ own action intentions, the role 
of pity in comparison to other prosocial emotions showed a more nu-
anced picture. In the path analysis, pity, measured by a single item, 
was a weaker predictor of collective action, compared to outrage on 
behalf economically disadvantaged groups. However, pity with sym-
pathy and sadness became a stronger predictor than outrage, but only 
in the economic scenario, consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 
2. In the political scenario, such nuances between prosocial emotions 
did not appear, as pity, sympathy, and sadness were uniformly less rel-
evant in mobilization for collective action compared to outrage.
The inconsistent finding with the single item pity measure raises 
the question why this emotion functioned differently in the real life 
(Study 1 and 2) versus in the fictitious scenario (Study 4). A possible 
explanation is that in Studies 1 and 2, the only prosocial emotion 
we “offered” to participants was pity, while in Study 4, we assessed 
pity, sympathy, and sadness one after the other, which might have 
led to a contrast effect, and a preference for sympathy compared to 
pity (even in line with social desirability). However, when pity was 
combined with either sympathy or sadness or both, we again found 
consistent results, which suggests that even if these emotions are 
distinguishable, they are closely related.
A limitation of this study is that we cannot completely clarify the 
difference between sympathy and pity, but we could highlight the 
mobilization potential of these prosocial emotions for economically 
disadvantaged groups, but not for politically disadvantaged groups.
Our experiment had some further limitations. First, we did not 
manipulate participants’ own emotions, therefore our outcome 
variable was the expected collective action by an ally. By this, we 
investigated perceptions of normative behaviors depending on the 
type of disadvantage and emotional reactions of pity versus outrage. 
Nevertheless, we could also investigate the connections between 
participants’ own emotions and collective action intentions in light 
of the type of outgroup disadvantage.
Another problem was that we used images in addition to the de-
scription to manipulate the type of disadvantage. By using an image 
of a child in the economic condition we aimed to reinforce the vi-
gnette that also explicitly mentions how children are affected by 
economic disadvantages, compared to the political condition where 
children were also mentioned as affected, but on a more abstract 
level (so we used an abstract image). It is part of our argument that 
perceived vulnerability accounts for the pity–ally collective action 
intention link: the more a target group is perceived as being needy 
and deprived, the more prosocial emotions are evoked, which can 
motivate supportive behavior in more possible forms (not only as 
donation, but also as collective action).
However, it can be asked whether the description of economic 
disadvantage by itself or with the addition of the image of a child 
drove the effect of the manipulation. Still, the fact that there was 
no main effect of disadvantage type on attributed collective action 
intentions, and no difference in participants’ own collective action 
intentions between scenarios, is in line with the view that the picture 
did not have a confounding effect on our main dependent variable, 
collective action intentions. Furthermore, the fact that our results in 
Study 4 are consistent with the findings in Studies 1–3 supports the 
reliability of the findings.
6  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
Most collective action studies use small to medium purposive or 
convenience samples with scenarios involving imagined transgres-
sions in experimental design. A strength of our research is that it 
investigated ally action intentions with big community samples not 
only from Western democracies, but also from Eastern Europe. Our 
main findings were replicated in the German and the Hungarian con-
text, in connection with two real groups, the Roma and refugees. 
Finally, our findings were supported by an experiment.
Previous research has not addressed the specific conditions 
under which pity as a prosocial emotion can have a distinguished 
role in collective action. We argued that toward both economically 
and politically deprived groups, similarly to outrage, pity leads to 
prosocial behavioral intentions and even collective action inten-
tion, but we did not expect that function of pity for economically 
not deprived groups. We conducted Studies 1 and 2 to test the ally 
intentions of advantaged group members in intergroup contexts that 
reflected both large economic and social/political injustices. In Study 
3 we contrasted these to a model for a group that was socially and 
politically but not economically disadvantaged. Finally, in Study 4, 
we compared the role of pity and outrage toward an economically 
and politically versus only politically disadvantaged fictitious group 
in an experiment.
Pity was a stronger predictor of donation intentions than of 
collective action intentions in all models connected to economi-
cally marginalized groups but predicted both behaviors in all cases. 
In fact, collective action intentions were just as strongly, or even 
more strongly, predicted by pity than by outrage in all three in-
tergroup contexts of Studies 1 and 2 (in connection to the Roma 
and refugees). This pattern was partly found in the scenario of 
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the economically disadvantaged in the experiment of Study 4. We 
argue that the reason for this is that pity is an adequate emotional 
response toward groups in need of material resources where allies 
recognize the injustice of the situation, so prosocial action leads 
to both ally collective action and donation intentions. In contrast, 
Study 3 and the scenario of the politically disadvantaged outgroup 
in Study 4 demonstrated that pity is less adequate when a group 
is not economically deprived, but socially and politically disadvan-
taged, therefore it leads to ally collective action intention to a lesser 
extent, compared to outrage. In connection with gay people and 
with the fictitious group in the political disadvantage condition, out-
rage was a more important predictor of collective action. Outrage 
about policies is a more adequate response to their disadvantage, 
compared to feeling pity toward them.
An additional explanation for the stronger effect of pity com-
pared to outrage concerning marginalized outgroups may be that 
pity is a more sustainable emotion than outrage or anger (Carver 
& Harmon-Jones, 2009). Prosocial emotions such as pity could be 
more generally present among members of the advantaged group, as 
it is an other-focused emotion that could appear even in the absence 
of a specific reason for grievance (Thomas et al., 2009). Therefore, 
pity or sympathy can be a useful basis for mobilization on behalf of 
the severely deprived.
Our findings suggest that in intergroup contexts with large sta-
tus differences, the main division is not between actions that main-
tain the status quo by offering “only” donations versus engaging in 
politicized actions for social change, but rather between acting at 
all or not doing anything. The social change potential of a specific 
emotion and action might be dependent on the intergroup context, 
therefore feeling pity (and giving donation) is not uniformly paternal-
istic (Becker et al., 2019), it can be an adequate response to a group’s 
suffering. Helping in the form of donations based on feelings of pity 
may be psychologically similar to engagement in political action in 
these particular intergroup contexts.
7  | LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
DIREC TIONS
In the present research, we did not focus on the differences between 
shades of prosocial emotions, which is also an interesting field for fu-
ture research. We used the Hungarian expression “sajnálat” and the 
German word “Mitleid” to measure pity, which makes the picture com-
plex. Emotions of sympathy and pity have different meanings in English, 
and different connotations in other languages (Frijda, Markam, Sato, 
& Wiers, 1995; Russell, 1991). A recent study highlighted how much 
the meaning of emotions is dependent on the traditions of specific 
language families, and pity is exactly that type of emotion which has 
different connotations in each context. Pity is closer to grief in Indo-
European languages, but it is also related to love in other languages 
(Jackson et al., 2019). Nevertheless, emotions are not “natural kinds” 
(i.e., biologically determined), but a result of subjective categorization 
and social learning (Feldman Barrett, 2006). Our goal in the current 
study was not to look at the differences between specific prosocial 
emotions, but to compare the role of pity to outrage in mobilization 
within specific intergroup contexts.
We used a one-item measure of pity in Studies 1–3, which is a 
clear limitation of our studies. Therefore, in Study 4, we used not 
only an item for pity, but added sympathy and sadness, so we could 
use each item independently and in combination to see how mea-
sures influence findings. This left us with mixed results: unlike survey 
findings, pity alone was not a better predictor for collective action 
compared to outrage, but only when it was used together with sym-
pathy or sadness. This suggests that sympathy was a slightly more 
mobilizing emotion than pity among participants, and together with 
pity they were more important predictors of action than outrage, 
but only in case of economically disadvantaged groups. Such differ-
ences between prosocial emotions did not appear toward politically 
disadvantaged groups, as they were uniformly weaker predictors in 
comparison to outrage.
It is important to note that highlighting the special function of 
pity toward deprived groups does not mean that we want to promote 
pity as a mobilizing emotion compared to other prosocial emotions, 
such as sympathy or empathy. In contrast, we argued that pity can be 
a “good enough” emotion, as a reflection to an outgroup's perceived 
low status, when the outgroup suffers not only socio-political but 
material disadvantages. We proposed that such perceptions, even 
without high identification with the outgroup, indicated by sympa-
thy or empathy, can raise pity, which in turn can lead to behavioral 
intentions on behalf of the outgroup.
Giving a helping hand in the form of either collective action or 
donations can function as an opportunity for the advantaged to 
get involved on behalf of the marginalized to restore social justice. 
Furthermore, mobilizing a wider pool of advantaged group mem-
bers based on prosocial emotions can be an important step toward 
achieving the social change that political activists also strive to 
achieve.
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APPENDIX A
SC ALE ITEMS OF S TUDY 1
Injustice awareness
Politicians do not stand for the interests of the Roma minority in 
my country.
Members of the Roma minority are disadvantaged in terms of 
their rights, compared to the Hungarian majority.
Pity
If you think of the situation of Roma people in Hungary, to what 
extent do you feel the following emotion? Pity about the situation 
of the Roma
Outrage
If you think of the situation of Roma people in Hungary, to what 
extent do you feel the following emotion? Outrage about the situa-
tion of the Roma
Donation intentions
I would support an NGO helping the Roma by giving money to 
them or in other ways.
I would donate clothes, other tools or food to an NGO helping 
Roma families in need.
Collective action intentions
I would gladly participate in lectures or workshops that address 
the topic of unequal treatment of the Roma.
I would join other people's initiatives (e.g., signing a petition) on 
behalf of the Roma.
I would support an initiative with the goal of enabling the Roma to 
get into higher positions.
I would participate in an event (e.g., a demonstration on the street) 
for Roma rights.
SC ALE ITEMS OF S TUDY 2 A ,  2B ,  3
Injustice awareness
The way refugees/gay people are treated in Germany/ Hungary 
is unfair.
It is proper that German/Hungarian/heterosexual citizens have 
more rights in Germany/ Hungary than refugees/gay people. 
(reversed)
I think [refugee/gay] policy in Germany/Hungary meets the needs 
of refugees/ gay people. (reversed)
It is socially unjust how refugees/gay people in Germany/Hungary 
are treated.
I think the German/Hungarian refugee policy intensifies the prob-
lem of social injustice. (omitted item for lack of fit)
Pity
If I think of refugees/gay people in Germany/ Hungary, I feel pity.
Outrage
If I think of refugee policy/policies concerning gay people in 
Germany/Hungary, I feel outraged.
Donation intentions
Donate clothing, school supplies or toys for refugees (omitted in 
Study 3)
Donate money to an organization supporting refugees/gay people
Motivate others to donate for refugees/gay people
Collective action intentions
Imagine that a great number of refugees move to your neighbor-
hood. What is the likelihood that you would participate in the follow-
ing actions? (only in 2a and 2b)
Demonstrations demanding more rights for refugees/gay people.
Preventing deportation of refugees (“stop deportation”)/I would 
raise my voice for gay people.
Sign a petition seeking more rights for refugees/gay people in 
Germany/Hungary.
Motivate others to participate in demonstrations demanding 
more rights for refugees/gay people.
SC ALE ITEMS OF S TUDY 4
Injustice awareness
The way village inhabitants are treated is unfair.
It is proper that village inhabitants have more rights in Anduria 
than city inhabitants. (reversed)
I think the government's policy in Anduria meets the needs of vil-
lage inhabitants. (reversed)
It is socially unjust how village inhabitants are treated by the 
government.
Emotions
Imagine that you are also a citizen of Anduria living in one of the 
main cities. If you think of the situation of village inhabitants to what 








Please, remember the comment you read before the news item. 
What do you think, how likely it is that Tamas Simor, the Andurian 
city inhabitant who posted the comment would participate in the 
following actions?
Own collective action intentions
Now please try to imagine that you are a city inhabitant of 
Anduria.
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What do you think, how likely it is that you would participate in 
the following actions?
Donation intentions
Donate clothing, school supplies or toys for families in villages
Donate money to an organization supporting people who live in 
villages
Motivate others to donate for those living in villages
Collective action intentions
Participate in lectures or workshops that address the topic of un-
equal treatment of village inhabitants
Support an initiative with the goal of enabling the village inhabit-
ants to get into a better position
Demonstrations demanding more rights for village inhabitants.
Sign a petition seeking more rights for village inhabitants
Motivate others to participate in demonstrations demanding 
more rights for village inhabitants
Economic disadvantage (MC)
The basic needs of families in the villages are not met.
Villages became poor compared to the cities.
Village inhabitants and their children have insecure living 
conditions.
Political disadvantage (MC)
The rights of village citizens are violated.
Village inhabitants are excluded from political decisions.
Village inhabitants are hindered in their participation in national 
elections.
APPENDIX B
Vignettes used in Study 4
The language of the manipulation and the questionnaire was 
Hungarian.
INTRODUC TION TO ALL PARTICIPANTS
Anduria is a democratic country that faces some economic hardships 
because of its unfavourable climate. Seventy-eight percent of the 
Andurian population live in cities, and 22% in villages. Life in Anduria 
is very centralized in the cities, because there are more work oppor-
tunities and more schools in the cities, and this is where people can 
engage in public affairs. Andurian citizens from the cities are aware 
of their own rights and responsibilities, and they are capable of influ-
encing public affairs. Now imagine that you are one of the citizens of 
Anduria who lives in a city.
The Andurian government represents only the interests of people 
living in the cities as opposed to the interests of village inhabitants. 
The discrimination of the village inhabitants happens only because of 
political interests. City inhabitants like you are rarely aware of this, but 
recently there have been more and more media reports highlighting 
the disadvantaged situation of the village inhabitants. In the next page, 
you will read a Facebook post about such news that was shared by an 
Andurian citizen from the city.
Please, try to put yourself in the shoes of an Andurian citizen of a 
city, and respond to the following questions accordingly.
Manipulation of economic and political versus only political 
disadvantage.
THE ECONOMIC DISADVANTAG E SCENARIO
ANDURONLINE.COM
VILL AG E INHABITANTS LIVE IN FINANCIAL INSECURIT Y
Andurians have to register in order to participate in elections and ref-
erenda but registration is only possible in the cities. Transportation 
between the villages and the cities is underdeveloped, which makes 
the political participation of the village inhabitants practically im-
possible. Despite the efforts of village inhabitants, the government 
failed to allocate resources for the improvement of transportation 
and to ensure equal rights for village inhabitants. Decision-makers 
neglect the rights of village inhabitants, because their political suc-
cess is not dependent on their votes. Because of this, the rights of 
village inhabitants are violated: they do not have the opportunities 
(such as influencing public affairs, gaining financial benefits, and re-
ceiving legal redress) that city inhabitants enjoy.
Village inhabitants also struggle with poverty. Families are severely 
deprived, especially those with school age children. After paying for text-
books, the cost of transportation to the schools, and school meals, families 
do not have enough money even for basic needs such as the cost of utilities 
and food. Because of this, they live in constant financial insecurity, which 
their children suffer from the most. Andurian children from villages have 
a higher rate of chronic diseases and mental illnesses compared to city 
children. The school performance of village children also falls behind com-
pared to city children, which has a negative long-term impact on their lives.
THE POLITIC AL DISADVANTAG E SCENARIO
ANDURONLINE.COM
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CIVIL RIG HTS OF VILL AG E INHABITANTS ARE 
VIOL ATED
Andurians have to register in order to participate in elections and ref-
erenda but registration is only possible in the cities. Transportation 
between the villages and the cities is underdeveloped, which makes 
the political participation of the village inhabitants practically im-
possible. Despite the efforts of village inhabitants, the government 
failed to allocate resources for the improvement of transportation 
and to ensure equal rights for village inhabitants. Decision-makers 
neglect the rights of village inhabitants, because their political suc-
cess is not dependent on their votes. Because of this, the rights of 
village inhabitants are violated: they do not have the opportunities 
(such as influencing public affairs, gaining financial benefits, and re-
ceiving legal redress) that city inhabitants enjoy.
Living conditions of the village inhabitants do not differ significantly 
from those of people living in the cities. Many families have children 
who attend schools. Travelling to the schools costs extra money for 
them, but they earn enough to pay for textbooks, and school meals 
and other food. Village inhabitants therefore live in financial security, 
and children do not experience discrimination at first hand. As they get 
older, and their parents involve them in discussions about public af-
fairs, they gradually learn that although they are the same people, they 
have fewer rights than city inhabitants.
MANIPUL ATION OF THE PERCEP TION OF PIT Y AND 
OUTR AG E
Pity
Outrage
